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Abstract 
 The intuition that the success of science is a mark of sciences power 
to track the nature of our world, to permit us confidence that the descriptions 
of our best sciences are true (or approximately true), is not new.  Puntam 
(1975) popularized an argument based on this intuition; this argument is 
known as the No Miracles Argument.  Providing a convincing formulation of 
this argument has proven difficult, and recently Magnus and Callender 
(2004) have suggested that any probabilistic formulation (given form by 
Bayes theorem) is fallacious.  Earlier formulations suffer from problems just 
as deep; best explanation formulations are question-begging, for example.  In 
this article, I propose two constraints for those attempting to formulate the 
argument: first, we ought to narrow the scope of the argument, focusing on 
only a special set of successes, and, second, the epistemic principle that 
connects the intuition to the realist conclusion ought to be one that is 
defeasible (rather than probabilistic or categorical).  These constraints serve 
to avoid problems already set out in the literature, and make the No Miracles 
Argument a sort of local inference – one that is licensed by the case at hand, 
rather than a general rule.  That is, you may only sometimes infer to the truth 
or approximate truth from success. 
 
Keywords: No Miracles Argument, Scientific Realism, Selective Realism, 
Agreement of Independent Measurements, Base Rate Fallacy  
 
Introduction 
 If there are any miracles, certain successes of science are not among 
them.  Since Hilary Putnam’s work in 1975, arguments that rest on our 
intuition that the success of science cannot be a miracle have been popular 
tools for scientific realists.  Scientific realism, at its core, hinges on the idea 
that our best sciences are truth tracking.  That is, science, in its best theories, 
provides us with truthful, nearly truthful, or approximately truthful 
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descriptions of the world.  A simplistic way to put Putnam’s “no miracles 
argument” for realism is this: either the best explanation of scientific success 
is that science tracks the truth or the explanation is that the success is a 
cosmic coincidence.  Of course, either postulating a cosmic coincidence is 
unwarranted or it is no explanation at all.  Thus, we should take it that our 
best science tracks the truth.  If one is struck that this argument is no more 
than a false dilemma, do not fret.  My primary goal in this paper is to refine 
this argument so that it isn’t so obviously troubling (read, transparently 
question begging). 
 An interesting new attack on this argument involves the claim that 
the argument rests on an altogether different fallacy: the base rate fallacy.  
Magnus and Callender (2004) argue that the no miracles argument rests on 
this probabilistic fallacy, which occurs when reasoners fail to take into 
account pertinent statistical information that bears on their assessment of the 
probability of some proposition.  They are correct in their assessment of the 
no miracles argument as a probabilistic argument, but I argue that all this 
demonstrates that the argument is not a probabilistic one.  This will be my 
first refinement of the argument. 
 Further, Magnus and Callender suggest that wholesale arguments for 
realism, like the no miracles argument are bound for the circular file.4  
Wholesale arguments are attempts to vindicate realism that are not sensitive 
to particulars of the case; these arguments are supposed to make us realists 
regarding all of (our best) science.  They suggest that there may be good 
realist arguments for the existence of electrons, but not, say, top quarks; they 
call these arguments, retail arguments.  A refinement of the no miracles 
argument, a selective version, puts it among the retail arguments.  This will 
be my second refinement to the argument. 
 Finally, the scientific realism that is supposed to be vindicated by the 
no miracles argument tends to be quite overstated.  Not only does the no 
miracles argument require some refinement, but our basic notion of scientific 
realism needs some refinement, if not an overhaul.  As an extension of the 
refined no miracles argument I develop here, I will make some simple 
suggestions regarding a refinement of scientific realism.  These suggestions 
will be in line with a greater project, the development of Consilient Realism. 
 
                                                          
4 Gerald Doppelt’s Reconstructing Scientific Realism, in Philosophy of Science (Vol. 74) 
provides a novel take on the No Miracles argument.  He constructs a wholesale argument by 
expanding the explanandum of the Inference to the Best Explanation used in the no miracles 
argument in order to defend scientific realism for our best current theories.  While I find this 
idea oddly compelling, my strategy differs in two substantial ways: (1) rather than 
expanding the explanandum, I suggest we diminish it, and (2) I suggest we draw back from 
the standard Inference to the Best Explanation epistemology.  
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The Base Rate Fallacy and the No Miracles Argument 
 A statistical version of the No Miracles Argument is implausible 
according to Magnus and Callender, since it rests on a common statistical 
fallacy – the Base Rate Fallacy.  Consider the following example from 
Tversky and Kahneman (1982): 
A cab was involved in a hit and run accident at night. Two 
cab companies, the Green and the Blue, operate in the city. 
85% of the cabs in the city are Green and 15% are Blue. 
A witness identified the cab as Blue. The court tested the 
reliability of the witness under the same circumstances that 
existed on the night of the accident and concluded that the 
witness correctly identified each one of the two colors 80% of 
the time and failed 20% of the time. 
What is the probability that the cab involved in the accident 
was Blue rather than Green? 
 As it turns out, most people fail to assign the correct probability (and 
they miss by a lot).  The diagnosis: most individuals fail to take into account 
the base rates – the distribution of cabs in the city.  The correct probability 
assignment here is 41%.  If you didn’t guess right, don’t sweat it; there are 
several reasons that may have happened. 
 An obvious problem with this experimental set up is found in 
interpreting the problem.  What is the probability the cab involved in the 
accident was Blue rather than Green?  Well, do they mean Blue rather than 
Green given that the witness said it was Blue?  Presumably, yes.  But that is 
far from obvious.  Furthermore, Jonathan Koehler argues, persuasively, that 
base rate neglect (committing the base rate fallacy) is not as pervasive as we 
have been lead to believe. (1996)  The problem is not base rate neglect, but 
employment of base rates in a non-Bayesian manner.  That is, we do make 
use of base rates, but we do not always follow the Bayesian standard.  
Further, he argues that there may be other viable (rational) standards for 
deploying base rates.  If he is right, then subjects may not be irrational when 
they fail to state that the probability is 41%.  The point: while I agree with 
Magnus and Callender that the No Miracles Argument is in trouble when it 
comes to base rates, I do not agree with them that the intuition that drives the 
No Miracles Argument is in danger simply because people are notoriously 
bad at certain probabilistic judgments. 
 How do we get the “right” answer in the cab problem?  Consider the 
conditional probability in question: Pr (The cab in the accident was Blue | 
The witness identified the cab as blue).  To determine the value of this 
conditional probability, we will employ Bayes’ Theorem: 
 Pr (A|B) = Pr(B|A)Pr(A)/Pr(B) 
 And, the Theorem of Total Probability, which says the following: 
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Pr(B) = Pr(B|A)Pr(A) + Pr(B|~A)Pr(~A) 
So: 
Pr(A|B) = Pr(B|A)Pr(A)/[ Pr(B|A)Pr(A) + Pr(B|~A)Pr(~A)] 
 The likelihood, Pr(B|A), is given by the reliability of the witness as 
described in the story.  The witness reports the cab is Blue, when it is Blue, 
80% of the time.  We also know Pr(A), called a prior probability: 15% of 
cabs in the city are Blue.  Pr(~A) is also well defined in this case; since all 
the remaining cabs that are not Blue are Green, Pr(~A) is 85%.  Finally, the 
probability the witness says the cab is Blue, when it is Green, is also well 
defined; it is 20%, as given by the reliability of the witness.  So: 
Pr(A|B) = (.8)(.15)/[(.8)(.15)+(.2)(.85)] = (.12)/[(.12)+(.17)] = (.12)/(.29) = 
.41 
 Here, though subjects often fail to do so, we can determine the 
“correct” probability that the cab was Blue, given the witness’ report, since 
we have good access to the base rates and we can employ them in Bayes’ 
Theorem. 
 This is not the case in the No Miracles Argument.  Magnus and 
Callender (2004) suggest that a formal version of the No Miracles Argument 
looks like this: 
For any theory x, let Sx stand for the expression ‘x is 
successful’ and let Tx stand for the expression ‘x is true.’ Let 
~A be the negation of A and let Pr(A|B) be the probability of 
A conditional on B.  We may now gloss the argument in this 
way for some current theory: [1] The theory h is very likely 
successful. [2] If h were true, it would be very likely to be 
successful. [3] If h were false, it would not be likely to be 
successful. [4] Therefore, there is a high probability that h is 
true.  Formalizing this version of the argument yields: 
Pr (Sh) >> 0  (1) 
Pr (Sh|Th) >> 0  (2) 
Pr (Sh|~Th) << 1  (3) 
Therefore, 
Pr (Th|Sh) >> 0  (4) 
 Reintroducing our Bayesian formalism and replacing A with Th and 
B with Sh, we get the following: 
 Pr(Sh|Th) = Pr(Th|Sh)Pr(Sh)/[ Pr(Th|Sh)Pr(Sh) + Pr(Th|~Sh)Pr(~Sh)] 
 Recall that Pr(A) and Pr(~A) were set by the distribution of cabs in 
the population; in that case, it was easy to see how this calculation could be 
performed.  In the No Miracles version of this calculation, it is not see easy 
to see how we get a value for Pr(Sh), and in turn Pr(~Sh).  That is, to avoid a 
base rate fallacy, we must correctly determine this probability.  What is the 
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probability some theory h is true?  Well, that will depend on the distribution 
of successful theories in some population of theories. 
 Before we continue with our exploration of the No Miracles 
argument as a base rate fallacy, let me take a short detour.  It strikes me that 
the problem isn’t a base rate problem, but actually a much older problem – 
the problem of priors.  It is often caviled that the assignment of a probability 
that some theory is true, say to something like Newton’s theory, makes little 
sense.  Considering the probability that it is true that some theory is 
successful induces a similar vertigo.  Thus, base rate fallacy or problem of 
priors, the No Miracles argument formulated in the way Magnus and 
Callender suggest is in grave danger.  With respect to realism and anti-
realism disputes, Jon Dorling (1992) argues that the problem of priors can be 
resolved (and the base rate problem dissolved) if we take a subjective 
Bayesian approach to the problem.  That is, if the priors, Pr (A) and Pr (~A), 
are assigned in line with a subjects own degree of belief, then there is no 
need for an objective estimate of the Pr (Sh) – you merely draw it from your 
standing psychological state.  While this resolves the problem, it does so in a 
somewhat unsatisfying manner.5 
 Returning, then, to the question of how to get the base rates 
(determine the distribution of successful theories in some population of 
theories), Magnus and Callender make several suggestions and find them 
wanting.  Obviously, the h in the No Miracles argument is drawn from a 
population of successful mature theories.  At first, this additional assumption 
seems to be a good way to resolve the dispute in favor of Pr(Sh) >> 0.  
Magnus and Callendar make much hay of this, but it seems to me the right 
thing to say about this fact is this: there is an equivocation over “success” 
that matter here.  Either (1) success means the same in ‘h is successful’ and 
‘h is drawn from a pool of successful theories’, and we have Pr (Sh) = 1, or 
(2) success comes in degrees and h’s being drawn from a “successful” pool 
of theories does nothing to tell us just how high Pr(Sh) should be set, and we 
have still have a standing problem of priors (or base rate determination).  In 
case (1), the posterior Pr (Th|Sh) = 1.  This means that every theory is true, 
given that it is successful; this cannot be the case.  There are obvious counter 
examples to be found in the history of science.  In case (2), the problem for 
the no miracles argument is simply not resolved; we still have no objective 
way of assigning P(Sh) >> 0. 
                                                          
5 Sober (1990) and Hitchcock and Sober (2004) provide an interesting discussion of a 
likelihood version of the No Miracles Argument.  The later paper provides an additional 
worry for the No Miracles Argument: the kind of success we expect of our models involves 
selection in line with avoiding overfit to the data.  Thus, the best explanation as to the 
predictive success of a particular currently employed model is that it avoids overfit, not that 
it is true. 
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 As it stands, I am aware of no way to resolve this problem for the No 
Miracles Argument, short of conceding to Subjective Bayesianism, so I 
suggest the following: Modus Tollens –  the No Miracles Argument is not a 
probabilistic argument after all. 
 
Abduction and the No Miracles Argument 
 Another epistemology that has been traditionally employed in the 
realist literature is Inference to the Best Explanation.  Consider André 
Kukla’s formulation (1998): 
[1] The enterprise of science is (enormously) more successful than can be 
accounted for by chance. 
[2] The only (or best) explanation for this success is the truth (or 
approximate truth) of scientific theories. 
Therefore, 
[3] We should be scientific realists. 
First, let me take issue with the conclusion.  It is odd to state the conclusion 
of the abduction as a behavioral (or psychological) imperative.  For now, let 
us simply revise the conclusion as follows: the enterprise of science is truth 
tracking.  We will consider a further revision of this later, but for now this 
should allay some concerns. 
 Each of the two premises of the argument are in need of revision, so 
let us consider each of these in turn. 
 
Success 
 I suggest, in a manner contrary to Doppelt (2007) and in line with 
Psillos (1999), that we refine the explanandum.  The explanandum for our 
Inference to the Best Explanation is represented in [1] by the idea that the 
enterprise of science is (enormously) successful.  As Psillos notes, predictive 
success is just too easy to get.  This suggests the following strategy: we 
should restrict the explanandum, requiring that truth tracking be the best 
explanation for only some predictive successes, but not all the predictive 
successes of our sciences.  In this way, we will also move from a wholesale 
argument for realism to a retail one – we are realists only about some of the 
descriptions of our best current theories.  We are going to be selective 
realists; an accurate account of the epistemology of science only warrants 
belief that the descriptions of science are true in select cases. 
 Consider the beam balance example, introduced to the literature by 
Malcolm Forster (2000):  Place an object a a distance x1 from the fulcrum.  
Then move an object b left and right on the beam on the other side of 
fulcrum from a until the beam balances.  Measure the distance y1 that b is 
from the fulcrum when the beam is balanced.  Repeat this for different x1 
values (distances of a from the fulcrum) and record all the x1 and y1 pairs.  
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This is the data from Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, we do the same thing 
for objects b and c, and in Experiment 3, the same for objects a and c. 
 The series of experiments might be described by a single model, call 
it DUM (for DisUnified Model), which is comprised of three equations: 
DUM: (1) y1 = β1x1 (2) y2 = β2x2, and (3) y3 = β3x3. 
 For each experiment there are two variables, x and y, which are 
measureable distances, and one adjustable parameter, β, which is estimated 
from the data.  Once the β for a particular experiment is estimated, it 
provides a fixed mathematical expression of the relationship between the two 
objects and the two distances – its mathematical structure, the predictive 
curve, represents some fact about the experiment in question. 
For the sake of illustration, let us say you do the first experiment and get the 
following results: 
x (distance) y (distance) 
1 2 
2 4 
3 6 
 
 From these results, we can estimate the parameter β for the first 
experiment – of course, the estimate will be 2.  Thus, the mathematical 
equation for the first experiment is y1 = 2x1.  We can continue in a similar 
manner for the other two experiments. 
 If, however, we are allowed make use of the resources of a theory, 
like Newtonian Mechanics, we can generated a model that has additional 
predictive successes.  Mechanics when combined with a number of auxiliary 
assumptions, including idealizing ones, allows for the deduction of the 
following model, call it UNI (for Unified Model): 
UNI:  (1) ( )1 1a by m m x= , (2) ( )2 2b cy m m x= , and (3) 
( )3 3a cy m m x= . 
 Notice that when we employ the concept of mass, given by the 
Newtonian theory, we get a model that makes more predictions than its 
earlier counterpart!  UNI provides a relation among its sub-models which 
DUM does not, namely that ( )( )a c a b b cm m m m m m= ; let’s call 
predictions that can be made on the basis of this constraint emergent 
predictions – they emerge from the model generated by the introduction of 
some concepts from a theory.  For example, we can predict β3 in two 
different ways, (1) by doing the third experiment and (2) by using the 
previous two experiments and the constraint above to determine β3.  If these 
two measurements agree, we have an agreement of independent 
measurements. 
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 Now, we are in a position to refine the first premise of the No 
Miracles Argument: 
[1’] The agreement of independent measurements is a success of science that 
cannot be accounted for by chance. 
 This captures the intuition that there is something impressive about 
UNI that is not as impressive as the success of DUM.  Further, anti-realists 
and realists alike can agree that this is a predictive success of science that is 
certainly worthy of note in developing an account of theory selection in 
science. 
 
Explanation 
 The second premise of the No Miracles Argument hinges on the idea 
that the best explanation of the success of science is that its descriptions are 
true (or approximately true).  To get from this premise (and our earlier one) 
to the conclusion, philosophers have suggested the following inference 
pattern: Inference to the Best Explanation.  In essence, we can infer from the 
“bestness” of an explanation to the truth of that explanation.  Let us now turn 
to the second premise and this inference pattern, which requires the truth of 
the second premise. 
 Much to do has been made over the details and inductive strength of 
Inference to the Best Explanation.  A trenchant criticism of Inference to the 
Best Explanation is that it is question begging.  Explanation is merely a 
pragmatic virtue, not an epistemic one, on the anti-realist account of 
scientific inference; thus, we cannot infer from the best explanation to the 
truth of that explanation, or we have already won (or conceded) the debate 
regarding realism (or anti-realism).6  That is, the strategy in deploying a No 
Miracles Argument is to apply an inference commonly used in science 
(Inference to the Best Explanation) to science itself; since Inference to the 
Best Explanation is objectionable as an inference pattern properly deployed 
in science, it is again objectionable at this “meta” level. 
 In light of this concern, I suggest that we pare down the No Miracles 
Argument.  Rather than employ an inference pattern from the practice of 
science (like Inference to the Best Explanation), I suggest a more modest 
inference.  Let us employ the following principle: unless there is reason to 
think that some regularity is the result of cosmic coincidence, take it to have 
a cause in the world.  This principle may account for certain events in the 
history of science, like the dispute over hidden variables in Quantum 
Mechanics; until there was good reason (Bell’s Theorem and related 
experiments) to think there were no hidden variables, the research program 
to vindicate hidden variables seemed perfectly rational.  This principle 
                                                          
6 Kukla (1998), Laudan (1981), and Fine (1984) all make this point. 
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doesn’t suffer from the same problem (at least not to the same extent) as 
Inference to the Best Explanation, as anti-realists can also accept that there is 
a cause of the regularities in nature – they merely assert that we are 
epistemically removed from the nature or proper description these causes. 
 In light of this weaker principle, we can rewrite [2] as follows: [2’] 
Unless there is reason to think that the agreement of independent 
measurements is the result of cosmic coincidence, take it to have a cause in 
the world.  Now, we can get a more modest conclusion: [3’] The agreement 
of independent measurements has a cause in the world.  This has a realist 
flavor, but it isn’t so obviously inflated as to be transparently question 
begging.  Take the No Miracles Argument this way:  where there are 
agreements of independent measurements, and there is no established reason 
to take this agreement as a cosmic coincidence, science has made a discovery 
about the world.7  Of course, this isn’t much of a victory for realism just yet, 
since there are many notable anti-realist positions that will agree with this 
conclusion. 
 
Realism 
 So far, our modified no miracles argument is a retail argument for 
realism.  It doesn’t suggest that we should be realists writ large, merely that 
there are places where science tracks the truth (makes discoveries about the 
world).  One might begin to worry that this is not much like traditional 
realism that holds that the descriptions of the world provided by our best 
theories are true or approximately true.  This idea that there is a discovery 
made where there is an agreement of independent measurements doesn’t 
sound much like that brand of realism. 
 Notice that theory plays a role in the generation of UNI.  In fact, it is 
difficult to see how we would generate UNI at all without the resources (the 
concept of mass in particular) of Newton’s theory.  Now, many cavalier 
realists are inclined to take these predictive successes as demonstrating that 
Newton’s theory provides truthful descriptions of the world.  We have 
already seen that this inference is in danger, since a probabilistic account of 
this inference fails and an abductive account begs the question.  Realism 
needs to be more conservative in at least two ways.  (1) Since it is the model 
that provides for the predictive success of UNI over DUM and not the theory 
(writ large), a realist should be careful not to endorse the whole of the theory 
                                                          
7 My hunch is that this move is also objectionable on similar grounds to Inference to the 
Best Explanation.  However, this move is valuable in putting form to our intuitions about 
cases like UNI versus DUM.  I argue elsewhere that taking the agreement of independent 
measurements to be a discovery about the world has additional epistemic virtues – it is 
employed in the identification of artifacts and it allows for the detection of false predictions 
in earlier theories.  Work on this version of the argument is forthcoming. 
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in light of this success.  And, (2) as of now, our No Miracles Argument only 
gets you to the fact that the intersection of Newtonian Mechanics and the 
agreement of independent measurements (the success of UNI) has provided 
us with a discovery; this says nothing about which scientific descriptions are 
true.  However, it is difficult to see how we could escape endorsing some of 
Newton’s theory as true, given its role in this increased predictive success of 
UNI. 
 Recognizing that I already pulled explanation from the No Miracles 
Argument, at some point explanation has to play a role in scientific realism.  
Good realists take science to be meeting two goals: (1) increasing predictive 
success (like the development of models such as UNI), and (2) providing an 
explanation of these predictive successes.  Traditional, cavalier, realists take 
these to be simply tied together.  We have seen that these goals are tied 
together; the concept of mass, from Newton’s theory, plays a salient role in 
the generation of UNI and the discovery UNI allows.  However, meeting the 
second goal is not as simple as reading the true descriptions (given by a 
theory) off of the predictive successes of the theory, as the traditional realists 
seem to think.  Here I suggest a different strategy: we should use the theory 
to read into select predictive successes (agreements of independent 
measurements).  Here, we take the theory to provide true descriptions of the 
world only where we need it to read in an explanation of the discovery 
endorsed by (the non-miracle of) the agreement of independent 
measurements.8 
 This should allay the concern that our No Miracles Argument fails to 
get any sort of robust realism.  Of course, the No Miracles Argument only 
gets us to the conclusion that we have made a discovery where there is an 
agreement of independent measurements.  Once this discovery is made, the 
realist then asks, what is it that has been discovered?  The anti-realist, on the 
other hand, is happy with the increase in predictive success, and leaves it at 
that.  A realist, on my view can answer her question by looking to the theory 
in question to provide an explanation of the predictive success (and in turn 
the discovery). 
 In restricting our realism to descriptions directed at the discovery 
made by models of the theory, we have generated a selective realism.  This 
                                                          
8 In ongoing work, I argue that it isn’t even the current theory (the one we used to make the 
discovery) that is used to read in an explanation of the discovery itself, rather it is a future 
theory (whether a development of the current one or a revolutionary one) that is used to 
provide the explanation of the discovery.  Consider the way in which Relativity explains the 
successes (and failures) of Mechanics as an example of what I have in mind.  Taking this 
diachronic view of the second goal of realism (providing explanation of the predictive 
success of a theory) has additional epistemic virtues – for example, it allows us to identify 
what we thought were predictive successes that were, in fact, failures. 
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realism also focuses on the connections among theories, models, and certain 
kinds of predictive successes (the agreement of independent measurements).  
These are the two most fundamental building blocks of a conservative 
realism that I call Consilient Realism. 
 
Conclusion 
 Wholesale arguments for scientific realism, arguments indented to 
vindicate the claim that all of our best current theories track the truth, tend to 
face serious difficulties.  One such argument is the No Miracles Argument.  
Attempted analyses of this argument, as a probabilistic argument and as an 
Inference to the Best Explanation, run into immediate road blocks.  It seems 
transparent that the reason for this is just that these inference patterns are 
difficult to vindicate even within the proper pursuit of science; for example, 
Bayesian inference patterns make good sense in some cases, like ones where 
the base rates can be objectively determined, but seem to make little sense in 
other cases.  Turning these inference patterns to the whole of science (or 
even just the successes of science) becomes quite difficult.  As a result, 
philosophers of science have begun to push for retail arguments for realism; 
that is, some inference patterns in science to get us to truth some of the time, 
and others do not. 
 In this paper, we explored a retail version of the No Miracles 
Argument.  This argument, to avoid problems (like question begging!) had to 
be pared down.  We weakened the argument so that it only provides us with 
a proclivity to say that certain predictive successes (that rely on models 
derived from theories) are truth related (they underwrite the claim that we 
have made a discovery).  This doesn’t seem all that out of line with most 
anti-realist arguments.  The realist then takes science to be directed at a 
second goal, explanation; it is here that she parts ways with the anti-realists.  
Recognizing that theory plays a role in discovery (and predictive success), 
the realist seeks explanations of these discoveries.  These explanations are 
often read in to the discovery from the theory used to generate the agreement 
of independent measurements, but that need not be the case. 
 The Consilient Realist, when the view is fully developed, will hang 
her hat on the notion that realism isn’t so naïve as to think that all of our best 
sciences, in all their glory, track the truth.9  This has been an embarrassment 
to realism for long enough.  She will be pleased to note that realism is 
                                                          
9 A recent literature has arisen regarding problems with selective realisms (which is the kind 
of realism being endorsed in this essay).  Work by several philosophers, including, most 
recently, Elsamahi (2004), Chakravartty (2007), and Harker (2010, 2012) have considered 
this problem.  The success of the sort of No Miracles Argument I advance in this paper will 
depend on how that dispute turns out, and whether a selective realism based on the ideas 
generated by Forster’s beam balance, can survive the main line critiques. 
European Scientific Journal June 2015 /SPECIAL/ edition Vol.2   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
182 
compatible with anti-realism on one level, but that taking certain predictive 
successes as discoveries (rather than mere increases in predictive accuracy) 
plays a role other epistemically promising inferences (read, promissory note 
here).10  
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